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All parties to this proceeding are listed on the cover of this Brief. Appellant is Defendant 
Martineau & Company ("Martineau"). Appellees are Plaintiffs Daniel A. Miller and David M. 
Kimball ("Miller and Kimball"). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did the trial court improperly conclude that Daniel A. Miller and David M. 
Kimball ("Miller and Kimball") owed no contractual obligation to honor Martineau's lease? This 
issue presents questions of law and the application of the law to the facts. Appellate courts 
afford no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the trial court's 
conclusions for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
B. Did the trial court incorrectly allow foreclosure by Miller and Kimball after they 
had acquired both the mortgaged property and the debt securing that mortgage under 
circumstances "designed" to discourage participation by the public at a foreclosure sale? This 
issue presents a question of law and fact. The Appellate Court should afford no particular 
deference to the trial court's conclusion of law, but should review it for correctness. Scharfv. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). The Appellate Court should not set aside the trial 
court's factual findings unless they are "clearly erroneous, i.e. if the findings . . . are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Brixen and Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 
1039 (Utah App. 1989). 
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C. i)i»i the trial court improperly rely upon the Default Judgment and the timing of 
Martineau's motion to set it aside? Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion lor 
relici
 Lux_ J\... ' •*' * r •• r< l - . ihuse of discretion. Birch v. 
Birch, 77i P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. THE NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Martineau seeks to preserve its leasehold interest against a contractual breach and an 
improper foreclosure of Miller and Kimball's artificial debt to themselves. Martineau also seeks 
to reverse a $20,000 judgment for attorney's fees granted by the trial court in connection with the 
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
1. Appellees' predecessor began a judicial foreclosure of a 1986 Trust Deed affecting 
the Judge Building in Salt Lake City on January 8, 1992 by the filing of a Complaint in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. (R. 1-54). 
2. On February 11, 1992, the foreclosure Complaint was amended to add Martineau, 
a tenant in the Judge Building. The Amended Complaint sought a judicial determination that 
Martineau's leasehold interest was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 87-139). 
3. Because Martineau's lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed, Martineau 
allowed the court to enter a default judgment, limited to the proposition that Martineau's lease 
was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. The Default Judgment was entered March 3, 1993. (R. 
472-475). 
4. During the pendency of the foreclosure action and on the basis of the 
extraordinary documentation and the transaction described in the Statement of Facts below, 
Miller and Kimball purchased the Judge Building and became substitute Plaintiffs in the 
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foreclosure action. Concurrently, certain Defendants were dismissed and/or released from 
liability on the 1986 Trust Deed Note. (R. 798-837). 
5. On November 24, 1993, Martineau entered an appearance in the case and moved 
the court to restrain the pending foreclosure sale and to dismiss the foreclosure Complaint on the 
basis of transactions which took place after the Default Judgment. (R. 877-886). 
6. On November 24, 1993, the trial court verbally granted the request for restraining 
order, but never issued a written order. The pending Sheriffs sale was cancelled. 
7. The parties, by verbal stipulation, postponed any further legal proceedings during 
discussions of settlement. 
8. On October 7, 1994, Martineau also moved to set aside the earlier default 
judgment. (R. 972-974). This precautionary filing by Appellant was made in response to 
Appellees' counsel's concern that such a motion was necessary to fully resolve pending issues. 
9. The trial court conducted an evidentiary "preliminary hearing" on January 19, 
1995. It considered (a) the issue of whether to issue a preliminary injunction on the pending 
foreclosure sale, (b) Martineau's Motion to Dismiss the foreclosure action, and (c) Martineau's 
Motion to Set Aside the prior default judgment. (R. 1436-1558). 
10. On January 19, 1995, the trial court decided, from the bench, that the Default 
Judgment issues were dispositive and that the Default Judgment should stand. (R. 1549-1553). 
On or about June 29, 1995, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, denying Martineau's motions. (R. 1284-1288, Addendum No. 13). On May 26, 1995, the 
trial court ordered completion of the pending foreclosure. (R. 1282-83). 
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11. On May 24, 1996, the trial court entered an order awarding Miller and Kimball 
the sum of $20,000 for legal fees under Rule 65A. (R. 1329-1334, Addendum No. 14). 
12. Martineau filed its Notice of Appeal on June 21, 1996. (R. 1337-1339). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. On March 6, 1986, Judge Building Associates ("Associates") became the owner 
of real property ("Property") located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Property is 
commonly known as the Judge Building. The same day, Associates executed a Trust Deed with 
Assignment of Leases ("the 1986 Trust Deed") on the Property in favor of Republic Savings and 
Loan Association ("Lender") to secure a $2,300,000 note. (R. 15-38). 
2. On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a lease agreement ("Lease") with 
Martineau covering certain space located on the 5th floor of the Property. (R. 1165, Addendum 
2). 
3. Since the commencement of the Lease, Martineau has continuously occupied such 
5th floor space through the current time. (R. 1498). 
4. Martineau has never been in default of the Lease and has made timely payment of 
all of its obligations thereunder. (R. 1497). 
5. In the fall of 1992, Associates (owner and landlord) became delinquent in its 
monthly obligations to the Lender. (R. 84). 
6. On January 8, 1992, Lender filed a Complaint with this Court to initiate a judicial 
foreclosure proceeding of the 1986 Trust Deed. The Complaint alleged an unpaid balance owing 
to Lender from Associates of approximately $2,200,000. (R. 1-54). 
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7. Subsequently, on February 11, 1992, Lender amended its Complaint to join 
Martineau as a Defendant in an attempt to terminate the Martineau Lease through the foreclosure. 
(R. 87-139). 
8. No other existing tenants in the Judge Building were joined as Defendants. (R. 
87-139). 
9. The Amended Complaint sought no monetary relief against Martineau, but 
alleged only that the Lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 94, 98). 
10. Because the Lease was subordinate to the Trust Deed at such time, Martineau did 
not file an Answer to the Amended Complaint. A Default Judgment was entered on March 5, 
1993, finding that the Lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 472-475). 
11. On June 21, 1993, during the pendency of the foreclosure action and in 
cooperation with the Lender, Associates sold the Property to Miller and Kimball. The total 
purchase price was $750,000. Miller and Kimball made a down payment of $200,000 and 
executed a new Trust Deed ("new Trust Deed") and Note of $550,000 in favor of Lender. (R. 
1116-17). 
12. A convoluted set of sales documents was prepared in an attempt to allow Miller 
and Kimball to foreclose against themselves for the sole purpose of terminating the Martineau 
Lease, while protecting the position of the Lender on its new Trust Deed. Among the legal 
gymnastics concocted to try to achieve such result were: 
a. Lender assigned to Miller and Kimball the beneficial interest of the 
original 1986 Trust Deed, as well as the right to collect the unpaid balance on the original 
$2,300,000 Note. (R. 1165, Addendum 7). 
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b. Miller and Kimball then subordinated their beneficial interest in the 1986 
Trust Deed to the new Trust Deed held by Lender. (R. 1155-1158, Addendum No. 8). 
c. Associates and its principals were released from any liability on the 
original $2,300,000 note to Lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 4 p. 12). 
d. Miller and Kimball were substituted as Plaintiffs in this action. (R. 798-
837). 
e. Associates and its principals were dismissed as Defendants in this 
litigation. (R. 798-837). 
f. As part of the transaction, Miller and Kimball executed an Assignment of 
Leases ("Assignment of Leases") in favor of Lender as additional collateral to secure the 
new debt to Lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 9). 
13. As a result of the sales transaction, Miller and Kimball took over ownership and 
management of Property and became Martineau's landlord. Martineau has continued to pay rent 
under the Lease to Miller and Kimball. (R. 1498). 
14. Following completion of their purchase of the Judge Building, Miller and Kimball 
sought to complete the pending judicial foreclosure. Because Miller and Kimball already owned 
the Judge Building which they were foreclosing, the sole remaining purpose of the foreclosure 
was to terminate Martineau's Lease (and no other existing tenant's lease). Because of the 
subordination of Trust Deeds, any interested buyer at the foreclosure sale would now have to bid 
$2,200,000 and would still be subject to Lender's new Trust Deed of $550,000. Essentially, 
Miller and Kimball were foreclosing against themselves to terminate one selected lease in the 
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Judge Building, having previously released the original obligor of the 1986 Trust Deed 
(Associates) from any further liability. (R. 1165, Addendum No. 4, p. 12). 
15. Martineau did not become aware of the terms of the July, 1993 transaction to 
Miller and Kimball, including the convoluted sales documentation, until after the sale was 
completed. 
16. When Martineau became aware of the existence of documentation designed solely 
to eliminate his leasehold interest, Martineau sought a Temporary Restraining Order from the 
trial court to stop the pending Sheriffs sale. (R. 877-879, Statement of the Case, supra.) 
17. The new Trust Deed contains, inter alia, the following covenant made by Miller 
and Kimball: 
Borrower shall comply with and observe Borrower's obligations as 
landlord under all leases of the Property or any part thereof. 
[Paragraph 16.] 
(R. 1165, Addendum 6 p.12). 
18. The Assignment of Leases contains, inter alia, the following covenant made by 
Miller and Kimball: 
Assignor agrees: 
(a) to observe and perform all obligations imposed upon lessor 
under the Leases. [Paragraph 2.] 
"Leases" is earlier defined in such document as: 
. . . ail leases . . . now existing or hereafter entered into for all or 
any part of the premises . . . . [emphasis added.] 
(R. 1165, Addendum 9 p. 1). 
19. One of the lessor's covenants of the Martineau Lease states: 
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(b) Lessee hereby subordinates its rights in this Lease to the lien of 
any mortgage or deed of trust of lien or other security interest 
resulting from any method of financing or refinancing which 
encumbers or is intended to encumber the Building or the land 
underlying such and to all advances subsequently made upon the 
strength of such security. So long as Lessee is not in default 
under the terms of this Lease, however, this Lease shall remain 
in full force and effect for the full term hereof and shall not be 
terminated as a result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu 
thereof) of such mortgage or other security instrument to 
which Lessee has subordinated its rights pursuant to this 
Subparagraph, [emphasis added.] 
(R. 1165, Addendum 2, paragraph 33.) 
VIIL 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its acquisition documentation, Miller and Kimball agreed to honor the original Lease 
with Martineau. Such Lease guaranteed Martineau that it would retain the right to occupy its 
current office space for the current rent. Contracts with parties other than Martineau and Trust 
Deed beneficiary rights each fail to relieve Miller and Kimball of their obligations under the 
lease. 
Foreclosure became unavailable to Miller and Kimball when the debt supporting the 
foreclosure lost its practical reality. When the debtor and the creditor became one, and when the 
property owner and Trust Deed beneficiary became one, and when the landlord and Trust Deed 
beneficiary became one, the foreclosure became an abuse of process. In addition, Miller and 
Kimball should not be allowed to benefit from a judicial sale after intentionally designing the 
sale process to discourage potential bidders. 
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The default judgment against Martineau does not govern any more than the original 
relative priority of the Lender's property interest over Martineau's leasehold interest. It altogether 
fails to resolve Miller and Kimball's agreement to honor Martineau's Lease or Miller and 
Kimball's right to foreclose on the basis of an artificially maintained debt. In the alternative, 
fairness required the trial court to set aside the Default Judgment in light of subsequent 
developments. 
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees failed to sift out those fees which this Court has 
declared not recoverable under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, 
without a signed Temporary Restraining Order or written extension thereof, Rule 65 A does not 




A. MILLER AND KIMBALL AGREED TO HONOR MARTINEAU'S LEASE. MILLER 
AND KIMBALL COULD NOT UNILATERALLY AVOID THEIR DIRECT 
OBLIGATIONS TO MARTINEAU THROUGH AGREEMENTS WITH THIRI^ 
PARTIES. 
1. Miller and Kimball Promised to Honor Martineau's Lease. 
When Miller and Kimball bought the Judge Building in June, 1993, they promised, in 
writing, to assume all of the obligations of the landlord in Martineau's Lease. In the new Trust 
Deed, Miller and Kimball covenanted to "comply with and observe Borrowers' obligations as 
landlord under all leases of the property or any part thereof." (R. 1165, Addendum 6, p. 12.) 
Miller and Kimball again covenanted, in the Assignment of Leases, "to observe and perform all 
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obligations imposed upon lessor under the leases." (R. 1165, Addendum 9, p. 1). The 
Assignment of Leases defines "leases" to include "all leases . . . now existing . . . . " (R. 1165, 
Addendum 9, p. 1.) 
Miller and Kimball's "fundamental" lease obligation was to allow Martineau to occupy 
the premises for the time periods and for the rent amounts in the lease. (R. 1165, Addendum 2, 
p. 1.) Therefore, Miller and Kimball (as substitute landlord) must allow Martineau to occupy the 
leased premises for the rent amount stated in the lease. 
2. Concurrent Contractual Provisions Allowing Foreclosure Did Not Eliminate 
Miller and Kimball's Duty to Honor Martineau's Lease. 
Miller and Kimball incorrectly assume their agreements with the Lender, allowing or 
requiring foreclosure, eliminate Miller and Kimball's landlord obligations. But, to the extent 
Miller and Kimball's foreclosure rights jeopardize Martineau's leasehold, Miller and Kimball 
have agreed, by accepting the obligations of the lease, to honor Martineau's leasehold, in spite of 
a foreclosure. The lease obligations to which Miller and Kimball agreed to be bound provide: 
(b) Lessee hereby subordinates its rights in this Lease to the lien of 
any mortgage or deed of trust of lien or other security interest 
resulting from any method of financing or refinancing which 
encumbers or is intended to encumber the Building or the land 
underlying such and to all advances subsequently made upon the 
strength of such security. So long as Lessee is not in default 
under the terms of this Lease, however, this Lease shall remain 
in full force and effect for the full term hereof and shall not be 
terminated as a result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu 
thereof) of such mortgage or other security instrument to 
which Lessee has subordinated its rights pursuant to this 
Subparagraph. [Paragraph 33.] [emphasis added.] 
Of all the lease terms and clauses, the above paragraph most specifically and directly 
defines Martineau's rights in the event of foreclosure proceedings. Miller and Kimball have 
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expressly agreed to abide by these terms. This Court should enforce the above provision in spite 
of any provision less specific to this issue. This can be accomplished by either (1) dismissing the 
foreclosure for the reasons discussed below, or by (2) affirming the foreclosure and ordering, as a 
matter of law, that the Martineau Lease remains effective following the foreclosure. 
B. PRINCIPALS OF EQUITY PROHIBIT MILLER AND KIMBALL FROM USING A 
MANUFACTURED FORECLOSURE FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE. 
As part of the June, 1993 purchase of the property, Miller and Kimball intentionally 
designed a plan to complete the foreclosure of the property they had just acquired, purposely 
create a situation to discourage potential bidders at the Sheriffs Sale, subordinate subsequent 
debt to the trust deed being foreclosed, release the original obligor (Associates) from any liability 
on the note (thus eliminating any incentive of such obligor to attend the sale or redeem the 
property post-sale) - all for the purpose of terminating one selected lease in the building just 
purchased. 
A judicially supervised foreclosure sale should have as its purpose the maximum 
protection of everyone's rights. A designed process to discourage bidders, increase the bid price, 
or lower the desireablitiy of the sale runs counter to the purpose of the process. In the instant 
case, Miller and Kimball have been allowed to do all of the above for the sole purpose of 
terminating only one of the leases involved with the Judge Building. The circumstances 
surrounding this transaction have, in effect, eliminated the debt which formed the initial basis of 
the foreclosure. Certainly no substantive debt remained after the paperwork was completed. 
A genuine debt is a prerequisite to a foreclosure. When the debt ends or ceases to be 
genuine, the right to foreclose ends. Foreclosure, by definition, interferes with property rights. 
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The law justifies such interference for only one reason: to pay a genuine priority debt. When the 
debt is gone, the rationale underlying foreclosure rights is gone, and foreclosure rights go with it. 
As part of the June 21, 1993 transaction, the original debtors, the Associates, were 
released from their liability to the lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 4, p. 12.) Miller and Kimball 
became the Trust Deed beneficiaries and the owners of the property securing the 1986 Trust 
Deed. (R. 1165, Addendum 7). Therefore, they became the debtor and the creditor of the same 
debt. Under these circumstances, for all practical purposes, the debt which justified foreclosure 
ceased and the right to foreclose ceased. As one treatise explained: 
As we have before seen, the debt is the principal thing, and the 
mortgage is merely incident, and the question is, not whether the 
mortgage is merged, but whether the acquisition by one person of 
both the mortgaged land and the debt secured by the mortgage has 
the effect of extinguishing or merging the debt. If the debt is 
extinguished under such circumstances, the mortgage lien is 
necessarily also extinguished, while if the debt remains the 
mortgage lien also remains. 
Tiffany, Law of Real Property. § 1479 p. 504. (emphasis added). 
Miller and Kimball persuaded the trial court that they could proceed with foreclosure 
because they did not intend a merger of legal title and the existing lien on the property. There are 
authorities which support that proposition. But the real question is whether the property owner, 
who is also the Trust Deed beneficiary, should be able to use this illusory debt to itself as a basis 
for clearing title of inferior rights. Foreclosure of a person's debt to himself should not be a 
means of interfering with others' property rights. 
The body of law dealing with merger when a property owner 
purports to "acquire" a mortgage encumbering the property is far 
less substantial than that involving a mortgagee who acquires the 
encumbered property. Merger is completely inapplicable to the 
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enforceability of a mortgage after the property owner "purchases" 
it. The owner's payment to the mortgagee, the alleged purchase, 
only constitutes payment of the debt supporting the mortgage with 
a resulting extinguishment of the mortgage lien. Therefore, 
because payment of a senior obligation necessarily advances 
junior obligations in priority, the owner never should be permitted 
to use the mortgage to clear the property title of junior liens. This 
conclusion follows whether the owner is the original borrower, a 
grantee of the borrower, or a grantee further removed in the chain 
of title, [emphasis added.] 
Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger. Vol. 40:283 Vand. L. Rev., pp 362-63, (1987). 
Another treatise observes: 
If the mortgage debt is extinguished, the mortgage itself is never 
kept alive. Consequently there is automatic merger of the two 
interests in the property and no intent on the part of the creditor 
can keep them separate, [emphasis added.] 
Osborne, Real Estate Finance Law. § 6.14 pp. 411-12. 
As the same commentator states: 
If the grantee had taken subject to the mortgage without assuming 
its payment the only one personally liable is the mortgagor. Where 
such a grantee takes an assignment of the mortgage, as a general 
rule the debt secured by the mortgage is held to be extinguished 
and personal liability on it cannot be enforced.... If the grantee 
paid the amount of the debt for the assignment, the mortgagor 
should be able to insist that it constituted payment of the debt 
rather than purchase of it. The reason is that, although the grantee 
incurred no personal obligation to pay off the mortgage, 
nonetheless when he bought the land subject to it, his bargain 
included as a part of the price the amount of the mortgage debt. . . . 
It would seem, therefore, that regardless of the value of the land, 
when a grantee subject to the mortgage buys in the mortgage, he 
cannot enforce any right on it against the mortgagor. 
Osborne, Real Estate Finance Law. § 6.14 pp. 416-17. 
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Miller and Kimball should not equitably be allowed to use the judicial foreclosure 
process inequitably. As indicated by the court in First Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 
Chickasha, Oklahoma v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, ftnt. 37 (Okla. 1992): 
A sheriffs sale may be set aside when (1) the sale price is so 
grossly inadequate that it shocks the conscience of the court; (2) 
the sale price is grossly inadequate and the sale is tainted by 
additional circumstances; or (3) the result is inequitable to one or 
more of the parties before the court. It is the court's duty, whether 
confirming or setting aside a sheriffs sale, to protect all parties 
concerned. The sale must appear to be fair and proper in all 
essential respects. United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss, Okl. 793 P.2d 
1359, 1364 (1990). [italics in original] [emphasis added]. 
A judicial foreclosure sale intentionally designed to discourage bidders and created on an 
artificial debt for the sole purpose of terminating a lease to which the Trust Deed beneficiary is 
bound, is not equitable. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT IN CONSIDERING SUBSEQUENT EVENTS JUSTIFYING 
RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT. 
The trial court based its decision to allow the foreclosure primarily on the fact that 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not timely filed. (R. 1549-1553). The 
trial court erred in concentrating on the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. Such Motion 
was filed eleven months after issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order as a precautionary 
measure only - a result of concern by Appellee's counsel that without such a Motion on record all 
of the issues before the trial court would not be at issue. 
The real issue before the trial court were events that occurred after the entry of the 
Default Judgment - events giving rise to legal or equitable claims that the 1986 Trust Deed was 
either extinguished, or otherwise was inequitably used for an unjust purpose. The convoluted 
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sales documents and legal gyrations surrounding the June, 1993 sale to Miller and Kimball were 
designed intentionally to discourage anyone from bidding at the pending Sheriffs sale. These 
events occurred after the March 3, 1993 Default Judgment. 
Inasmuch as the earlier Default Judgment merely established respective priorities as of 
that date, it was incorrect to consider subsequent actions in the context of the situation that 
existed in March of 1993. 
The trial court is correct that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed 
approximately 18 months after the Default Judgment was entered. However, Martineau did not 
know of facts justifying such relief for nearly nine months after the Default Judgment (March 
1993 to November 1993). When Martineau discovered the facts surrounding the manufactured 
Sheriffs Sale, it undertook action to "undo" the Default Judgment within a period of days. The 
Motion to Dismiss filed on November 24, 1993 was tantamount to the Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment. Certainly, Martineau did not unduly delay in taking action when the facts of 
the June 21, 1993 sale became known to him. 
These are precisely the circumstances which Rule 60(b) contemplated. It provides that a 
judgment may be set aside where "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application" or for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." For purposes of determining whether Martineau moved to set aside the judgment 
"within a reasonable time," the trial court should have measured that time from the date Miller 
and Kimball relied upon terms which were not in the judgment, but which Miller and Kimball 
implied from the judgment. In other words, even if the trial court agreed with Miller and 
Kimball's interpretation of the default judgment, Miller and Kimball's reliance upon the strict 
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language of the default judgment was reasonable enough and fair enough that the court should 
have set aside the default judgment to allow the foreclosure issue to be resolved on the merits. 
Therefore, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 24, that "Martineau's 18 month delay in moving to 
set aside the default was not reasonable" ignores the circumstances which developed during those 
18 months, which made in unfair to apply the default judgment in the manner proposed by Miller 
and Kimball. (Addendum 13). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES MISAPPLIED THE 
LAW AND ABUSED THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
Subsequent to the January, 1995 evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that Miller and 
Kimball were entitled to $20,000 in attorneys fees. Such award was made pursuant to Rule 
65A(c)(2) which reads: 
(2) Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not 
establish or limit the amount of costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or 
preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded to a party 
who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined. 
Such award of fees is inappropriate because 1) the award of fees exceeds the scope of 
Rule 65A and 2) the trial court failed to differentiate between fees which were arguably 
"allowable" under the rule, and fees which clearly were not allowable. 
1. Appellees Are Not Entitled to Fees. 
Appellant concedes that Miller and Kimball were initially restrained by the trial court, 
even though no written Temporary Restraining Order was ever executed by the trial court. No 
preliminary injunction was ever issued, verbally or in writing. 
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Following entry of the verbal restraining order on November 23, 1993, Appellant's 
counsel drafted a proposed order and circulated the same to counsel for Miller and Kimball 
Counsel never approved the form of the order, nor returned the same to counsel for Appellants. 
(R. 1205). The hearing on Appellant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction was heard more than 
thirteen (13) months after the restraining order expired. 
Any award of fees should be limited to any fees incurred during the ten day period 
contemplated by the verbal temporary restraining order and should not cover fees incurred during 
the more than thirteen (13) months when no restraining order nor injunction was in effect. The 
more than thirteen (13) month delay in the preliminary injunction hearing occurred due to 
Appellee's delay or requests for continuance of the hearing (R.1207). 
Rule 65A(b)(2) reads in pertinent part: 
The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not 
to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so 
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period 
or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that 
it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the 
extension shall be entered of record, (emphasis added). 
No original restraining order was signed by the trial court, no extension was signed by the 
trial court, and no reasons for any extension were "entered of record". 
The trial court's order following the evidentiary hearing makes no determination that the 
verbal restraining order was "wrongfully issued" or that Appellees were "wronfully restrained". 
The order denied Appellants pending motions, including a request for entry of a preliminary 
injunction. 
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In Birch Creek Irrigation Co. v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court grant of a temporary restraining order and subsequent injunction 
because there was no strict compliance with Rule 65A. The Court stated: 
[T]he order failed to comply with the requirement that if a 
temporary restraining order is extended, "the reasons for the 
extension shall be entered of record." Utah R.Civ. P. 65A(b) 
(1991). In fact, whether the order was ever extended remains in 
dispute. Birch Creek claims that the order, originally set to expire 
by its terms on July 8,1991, was extended by stipulation of the 
parties. The Protheros, however, contend that they agreed to 
continue only the hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. 
The record supports the Protheros' position. Both the signed 
stipulation for continuance and the resulting court order speak to 
continuing only the hearing. Neither mentions the temporary 
restraining order, although Birch Creek's counsel, appearing 
unopposed, represented to the trial court that the stipulation 
covered both the hearing date and the restraining order. 
In light of these failings, we hold that the temporary 
restraining order expired by its terms and is therefore no longer in 
effect. 
858P.2dat995. 
Except for the ten day period contemplated by the original, verbal restraining order, 
Miller and Kimball should not be awarded fees in this matter. 
2. The Trial Court Failed To Distinguish Between Allowable and Non-Allowable 
Fees. 
Even if Miller and Kimball are entitled to reasonable attorneys fees under Rule 65 A, the 
trial court erred in failing 1o limit the fees to what is allowed under the rule. 
The January 19, 1993 hearing considered 1) Appellant's request for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction to stop the Sheriffs sale, 2) Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the pending 
action as a result of the June, 1995 property sale to Miller and Kimball, 3) Appellant's Motion to 
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Set Aside Default Judgment, and 4) several new substantive issues bearing on Appellees' right to 
continue with the foreclosure (i.e. the contractual terms of the Lease, etc.). The preliminary 
injunction request, heard over one year after expiration of the verbal temporary restraining order, 
is the only matter considered by the trial court that arguably falls within the scope of allowable 
attorneys fees under Rule 65A. 
\ motion for a preliminary injunction, in and of itself, does not entitle Appellees to 
reasonable attorneys fees. The other motions and issues do not entitle Appellees to reasonable 
attorneys fees. I lie onh ' allowable fees under Rule 65A are those incurred from a "wrongful" 
restraint. As observed above, the trial court never made a finding that the Appellees were 
wrongfully restrained. 
I his Com t observed in Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993) that the 
type of legal services for which attorneys' fees may be awarded is very narrow. This Court held 
therein: 
[4] Although Rule 65 A justifies awarding attorney fees to 
wrongfully enjoined parties, those parties are only entitled to "fees 
. . . incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive 
relief and not to fees incurred in litigating the underlying lawsuit 
associated with an injunction. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 
933 (Utah App. 1990), remanded on other grounds, 806 P.2d 198 
(Utah 1991). See also Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 
App. 1987) (fees incurred preparing and arguing summary 
judgment were not properly awarded because they were not 
incurred as a result of the injunction). Thus, in the present case, 
Andy is entitled only to those attorney fees which would not have 
been incurred but for the application for, and issuance of, the 
preliminary injunction. Fees which would have been incurred 
anyway, in the course of proving Sandy's entitlement to judgment 
and refuting Tholen's defenses, are not recoverable under Rule 
65A. (emphasis added.) 
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Tholen at 597. 
Fees incurred by Appellees, not directly related to the restraining order, should not have 
been the subject of the trial court's award. 
In this matter, Appellee's counsel conducted no discovery, took no depositions, and did 
not engage in substantial legal proceedings. Much of the fees awarded included discussions 
between counsel over settlement matters. The only Court proceedings involved were the initial 
and informal temporary restraining order request to the Court, appearance at continued hearings, 
attendance at the evidentiary hearing (less than one day), and the drafting of pleadings. Two 
attorneys for Appellees attended the evidentiary hearing, resulting in duplicative and unnecessary 
expense. 
The trial court failed to make a sufficiently detailed examination of the attorneys' fees. 
The court's finding provides: 
8. The Court has reviewed the Affidavit of Mark R. Gaylord 
and Supplemental Affidavit of Mark R. Gaylord, has considered 
the experience of the attorneys, the amount of time spent, and the 
complexity of this matter. 
9. A substantial portion of the amount of time spent by 
plaintiffs' counsel after the issuance of the temporary restraining 
order on November 24, 1993, was spent in defense of the 
temporary restraining order, motion for preliminary injunction, and 
motion to set aside default judgment. 
10. The billing statements of Suitter Axland & Hanson contain 
some duplication of effort in this matter, and deductions have been 
made for time spent for specific items where deemed appropriate. 
(R. 1329-1334, Addendum 14). 
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